United States
Bankruptcy Court,
M.D. Florida,
Tampa
Division.
In re LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC.,
Debtor.
Bankruptcy
No. 95-10453-8P1.
Nov. 10, 1997.
Harley Riedel, Russell M. Blain, Tampa,
FL, for Debtor.
Frances M. Toole, Lacy R. Harwell, Jr., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Civil Div., Commercial Litigation Branch, Washington, DC, for U.S.
Mindy A. Mora, Paul S. Singerman,
Miami, FL, for Official Unsecured Creditors Committee.
Charles R. Wilson, Asst. U.S. Atty.,
Tampa, FL.
Joe Freeman, Tampa, FL, trustee.
ORDER ON MOTION TO EXERCISE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFSET AND CROSS-MOTION TO
ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONFIRMATION ORDER
ALEXANDER L. PASKAY, Chief Judge.
THIS IS a confirmed Chapter 11 case and the matter under
consideration is the Motion to Exercise Administrative Offset filed by the
United States of America (Government) and the Debtor's Objection and
Cross-Motion to Enforce the Provisions of the Confirmation order. In its
Motion, the Government contends that it is entitled to setoff the claims of the
Commodity Credit Corp. (CCC) in the amount of $2,401,377.89; the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) in the amount of $225,056.50; and the U.S. Customs in the
amount of $51,202.62 against the Debtor's claim against a maritime subsidy due
and owing by the Maritime Administration, Dept. of Transportation (MarAd) to the Debtor in the amount of $2, 832, 711.00. The
Debtor concedes that both the IRS and the U.S. Customs are entitled to setoff
their claims, but vigorously opposes any attempt to setoff the claim of CCC.
The facts relevant to the matters under consideration as they appear from the
record are without dispute and are as follows:
Prior to the commencement of this Chapter 11 case, and for
several years before, the Debtor was, as were other U.S. Flag Carrier Vessels,
the recipient of a subsidy paid by MarAd pursuant to
an Act of Congress (Title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, known as Title II, Public Law 480). The
subsidy was designed to assist U.S. Flag Carrier Vessels to compete with
foreign Flag Carrier vessels by paying eighty percent of the difference between
what the U.S. Carriers have to pay to their crews and what the foreign Flag
Carriers pay to theirs. In the past, the subsidy was paid after the Debtor
submitted its request for payment upon the completion of each voyage.
It is without dispute that at the commencement of the case MarAd agreed to continue to pay the subsidy to the Debtor
with the proviso that the Government's right to a setoff be preserved. Pursuant
to the Agreement approved by this Court on October 26, 1995, the Government
paid the subsidy in accordance with the invoices submitted for the balance of
the year 1995 and during the pendency of this Chapter 11 case.
In due course, MarAd audited the
invoices submitted by the Debtor and determined that MarAd
was, in fact, indebted to the Debtor. At the request of a U.S. Senator, the
Inspector General was directed to conduct a second audit of the invoices
submitted by the Debtor. This audit also determined that the Debtor was
entitled to an unpaid subsidy in the amount of $2,832,711.00. Thus, this amount
is no longer in dispute and is admitted by MarAd to
be due and owing to the Debtor.
On February 16, 1996, this Court entered an Order
establishing the bar date which required the filing of all proofs of claim on
or before April 5, 1996. On March 28, 1996, CCC timely filed Proof of Claim No.
1278 in the amount of $2,631,160.37. The claim was filed as a general unsecured
claim and included a statement that the claim was not subject to any setoff.
It should be noted that the Military Sealift Command (MSC),
an agency of the Government also filed a proof of claim, Claim No. 949, in the
amount of $702,885.00. Unlike CCC, however, MSC filed its claim as a secured
claim, listing accounts payable as its collateral. The accounts payable listed
on this proof of claim represented the monies which MSC owed to the Debtor on
account of cargo delivered by the Debtor. The IRS also filed a secured claim in
the amount of $225,056.50, asserting both a right to setoff the amount of
$17,378.97, and a security interest based on the Government's right of offset
against any claims the Debtor may have against the United States. The U.S.
Customs filed a proof of claim, also asserting a right of setoff.
On February 24, 1997, CCC filed its amended proof of claim
(Amended Claim) which for the first time contained the language intimating that
the Government intends to assert a right of setoff. The Amended Claim, filed
almost a year after the bar date, reduced CCC's claim
to $2,401,377.89. Unlike the initial claim, the Amended Claim asserted that CCC
has a right of setoff as to the $5,338.48 which was owed to Lykes
by CCC. The Amended Claim stated, just as did the original claim, that CCC is
entitled to share in the distribution as an unsecured creditor under the Plan.
In addition to identifying the setoff claim of $5,338.48, it also stated that
this was without prejudice to the right of CCC to setoff against other amounts
owed to Lykes.
On February 13, 1997, the Debtor filed its first Plan of
Reorganization. The original Plan filed by the Debtor was the result of
intensive negotiations with the major creditors which culminated in an
agreement by Morgan Bank Group to accept $13.5 million only on its $27 million
plus secured claim. Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. (Mitsui)
and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (Mitsubishi), holders of preferred ship
mortgages in the Pacific Class vessels, also agreed to take less than one-half
of their total of $70 million. This Plan provided
$500,000 for unsecured creditors and an additional $500,000 in insurance
benefits to tort claimants, including cargo claims.
The original Plan specifically identified the claimants
which the Debtor believed to be entitled to a right of setoff pursuant to 11 U
.S.C. § 553. Those claimants identified as asserting setoff rights were
classified as Class 5 creditors. CCC was not among the creditors whose setoff
rights were recognized by the Debtor. The Debtor placed the claim of CCC in
Class 17 as a tort claim.
The operative language of the original Plan provided,
... Persons or Entities that have held, currently hold or
may hold a Claim or other Debt, Liability or Equity Interest that is discharged
pursuant to the terms of the Plan are and shall be permanently enjoined and
forever barred to the fullest extent permitted by law from taking any of the
following actions on account of any such discharged Claims, Debts, Liabilities
or Equity Interests ... (d) asserting a setoff, right of subrogation or
recoupment of any kind against any Debt, Liability or obligation due to the
Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, the Reorganization Trusts, any of the CPL
Entities or their respective Properties, including the Acquired Assets, the
Vessels and the Excluded Assets ...
Original Plan, Article 11.4.
As was expected, the Debtor received numerous objections to
the Disclosure Statement and also to the original Plan. The Government was
among those who filed an objection to the Disclosure Statement. Its objection
was based solely on the description of the approvals required by MarAd for the transactions contemplated under the Plan. The
Government did not object to the Plan provisions which prohibited setoff. CCC
filed no objection to the Disclosure Statement and no issue was raised at the
hearing to the provision which prohibited any setoff. This Court approved the
Disclosure Statement and scheduled a confirmation hearing which provided that
all objections to confirmation shall be filed by March 24, 1997 and all ballots
for or against the Plan shall be filed no later than March 28, 1997.
To comply with certain objections, the Debtor filed an
Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement together with a First Amended Plan of
Reorganization (Amended Plan), which again prohibited the exercise of
post-confirmation setoff rights. On March 24, 1997, the Government asserted two
objections to confirmation of the Amended Plan. The first objection was served
on behalf of MarAd and MSC and related to the
requirement of the Plan that the consummation of the Amended Plan depended on
approval by MarAd to continue to pay the subsidy
described earlier. The second objection by the Government was filed on behalf
of the IRS which correctly noted that the Amended Plan did not make provision
for the retention of any setoff claim of the IRS. No government entity, other
than the IRS, urged the right of setoff. It is without dispute that CCC did not
raise the right of setoff. On March 28, 1997, CCC filed a non-voting ballot as
a Class 17 unsecured tort claimant.
This Court, having heard arguments of counsel on the
objections of MarAd and MSC, overruled both
objections and entered its Order confirming the Amended Plan on April 15, 1997.
It is without dispute that the closing of the asset purchase agreement which was
the basis of the First Amended Plan was dependant upon the ongoing subsidy
payments by MarAd and approval of MarAd
and MSC. The Order of Confirmation expressly recognized again the right of the
IRS, specifically, to exercise its right of setoff in the amount of, or no more
than, $225,056.50.
Notwithstanding vigorous efforts by the Debtor, MarAd, largely based on the objection to the continuing
payment of subsidies by SeaLand Service, Inc. (SeaLand), one of the Debtor's largest competitors, issued
its ruling on June 20, 1997. The ruling denied approval of the continuation of
subsidies if the First Amended Plan was consummated by asset sales to Canadian
Pacific Limited (Canadian Pacific) or its wholly-owned subsidiaries. Obviously
the ruling of MarAd left the Debtor and other plan
proponents, Blue Water and Canadian Pacific, with the option of either (a)
abandoning the entire transaction; or (b) quickly restructuring the transaction
without future subsidy payments. Despite the economic impact of the adverse decision
of MarAd, which was in excess of $60 million over
several years, Blue Water and Canadian Pacific announced they were prepared to
go forward without a subsidy provided, however, that certain additional
required issues be resolved and that the Debtor be able to attain additional
economic concessions from the principal parties of interest. As a result of
negotiations, Mitsui and Mitsubishi agreed to a further reduction of its claim
in the amount of $3.9 million; The Morgan Bank Group agreed to a reduction in
the amount of $675,000; the administrative and priority claimants agreed to a
reduction in the amount of $345,000; and the three major container lessors agreed to a reduction in the approximate amount of
$1 million.
The parties have raised the following arguments in support
of their respective positions related to the Government's right to setoff. The
Government contends that (1) the April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order was a
conditional order, which condition remained unfulfilled, and that, therefore,
the April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order which approves the provision precluding
setoff, does not have a res judicata effect barring
the Government's assertion of its setoff rights; (2) as a matter of law, setoff
rights under 11 U.S.C. § 553 survive confirmation of a plan of reorganization
without the need for objecting to the plan in order to preserve those rights;
(3) CCC's original and amended proofs of claim
preserved rather than waived CCC's setoff rights; (4)
the entities and agencies of the Government are a unitary creditor for purposes
of meeting the “mutuality” requirement of setoff; and (5) equitable
considerations are not part of the requirements for setoff under 11 U.S.C. §
553, and even if they are, CCC satisfies the test.
The Debtor, on the other hand, contends that (1) the April
15, 1997 Confirmation Order is a final, non-appealable order which eliminated
all setoff rights of the Government, except for those of the IRS in the maximum
amount of $25,000; (2) the CCC waived any secured claim or setoff claim by,
among other things, filing a general unsecured claim and a nonvoting ballot as
an unsecured creditor; (3) the Government has no right of setoff as between the
claims of different entities or agencies, and the proposed claims to be setoff
are not otherwise mutual; and (4) fairness dictates that this Court exercise
its discretion to deny the right of setoff in this matter.
WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT MAY MEET THE MUTUALITY REQUIREMENT OF SETOFF
USING THE CLAIMS OF DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT ENTITIES OR AGENCIES?
[1][2] In order for a creditor to offset the amount due from
a debtor, the creditor's claim must meet the following requirements: (a) the
amount owed by the debtor must be a pre-petition debt; (b) the debtor's claim
against the creditor must also be pre-petition; and (c) the debtor's claim
against the creditor and the debt owed the creditor must be mutual. See In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 164 B.R. 839 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (citation omitted).
The requirement at issue in the instant case is whether the government may meet
the mutuality requirement in offsetting CCC's claim
against the Debtor by amounts due by MarAd to the
Debtor.
The Debtor points to bankruptcy court decisions which have
narrowly construed the mutuality requirement and have concluded that the claims
of different agencies of the United States are not mutual. See e.g. In re Art
Metal U.S.A., Inc., 109 B.R. 74 (Bankr.D.N.J.1989) (Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation, a separate corporation although created by the government did not
meet mutuality requirement with the United States Postal Service); In re
Ionosphere Clubs, supra. The United States Supreme Court, however, held that
all federal government agencies are deemed a single unit for purposes of setoff
in a non-bankruptcy case. Cherry Cotton Mills v. United States, 327 U.S. 536,
105 Ct.Cl. 824, 66 S.Ct.
729, 90 L.Ed. 835 (1946). In the bankruptcy context, the Ninth and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeal considered interagency setoff under 11 U.S.C. § 553
and held that federal government agencies are treated as a single government
unit for purposes of setoff under 11 U.S.C. § 553. See In re Hal, Inc., 122
F.3d 851 (9th Cir.1997); In re Turner, 84 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir.1996) (en banc),
on remand 96 F.3d 465 (10th Cir.1996). Although the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has not ruled on this issue, this Court finds that the Government is a
unitary creditor for purposes of satisfying the requirement of mutuality under
Section 553.
Having concluded that the Government's right to offset amounts
due to and from different agencies is available, this Court turns to the issue
of whether the confirmed Plan operates as a complete bar to recovery based upon
the doctrine of res judicata.
WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT'S SETOFF RIGHTS ARE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA?
[3] The Debtor's Plan enjoins any creditor from “asserting a
setoff, ... of any kind against any debt, ... due to
the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, the reorganization trusts, any of the
Canadian Pacific entities or their respective properties, including the
acquired assets, the vessels, and the excluded assets.” Plan, Art. 11.4. The
Debtor contends that because CCC filed an unsecured claim, filed a ballot as an
unsecured creditor, albeit nonvoting, failed to object to those Plan provisions
prohibiting setoff except in those instances where the Debtor was able to
identify those claimants asserting setoff rights, and because the Plan was
confirmed and no appeal was taken, the CCC's
assertion of its setoff rights is barred by res judicata.
The Government, on the other hand, contends that a plan of reorganization
cannot abrogate setoff rights because setoff rights survive confirmation.
Further, even if a plan could prohibit the assertion of setoff rights, in this
case, the April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order was not a final order to which the
doctrine of res judicata applies.
Section 553 provides, in relevant part, “except as otherwise
provided ..., this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a
mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 553(a). Section 1141(a) provides in pertinent part, “except as
otherwise provided ..., the provisions of a confirmed plan bind ... any
creditor ..., whether or not the claim or interest of such creditor ... is
impaired under the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a). A fair
reading of these two Code Sections leaves no doubt that facially they are in
conflict and require a consideration of which of the two shall prevail over the
other. The difficulty lies in the two competing policies of “(1) not requiring
a creditor to disgorge an asset in its possession belonging to a debtor who
still owes it money, and (2) facilitating a reorganization found to be in the
interest of all creditors by mandating such a disgorgement .”
United States v. Driggs, 185 B.R. 214 (D.Md.1995)
Under the facts of this case, especially in light of the CCC's
failure to assert its setoff claim until after confirmation, this Court
concludes that facilitating the reorganization process is the overriding policy
in this case and that, therefore, the provisions of Section 1141 take
precedence over Section 553. Having reached this conclusion, it is appropriate
to consider whether Government's setoff claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
[4] The doctrine of res judicata
or claim preclusion applies to an order or judgment when the following four
conditions are satisfied,
First, the prior judgment must be valid in that it was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and in accordance with the
requirements of due process.... Second, the judgment must be final and on the
merits.... Third, there must be identity of both parties or
their privies.... Fourth, the later proceeding must involve the same cause of
action as involved in the earlier proceeding.
In re Justice Oaks II, Ltd., 898 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th
Cir.1990) cert. denied 498 U.S. 959, 111 S.Ct. 387,
112 L.Ed.2d 398 (1990). No one disputes that this Court had jurisdiction to
enter the April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order and that it was entered in
accordance with due process. Further, no one disputes that the CCC was a party
to the confirmation proceeding and that it had a full and fair opportunity to
raise its objection. See Justice Oaks II, Id. at 1550-1551 (“A party, for the
purposes of former adjudication, includes ‘all who are directly interested in
the subject matter and who have a right to make defense, control the
proceedings, examine and cross-examine witnesses and appeal from the judgment
if an appeal lies.’ ”). With respect to the fourth requirement, the confirmation
proceeding, in part, dealt with those provisions of the Plan which prohibited
the assertion of setoff rights except in those specific instances where the
Debtor had specifically identified claimants asserting setoff rights. Thus, the
Government's claim for setoff involves one of the same claims at issue at the
confirmation proceeding.
[5][6] With respect to the second requirement, it is
recognized that the entry of an order of confirmation constitutes a final
judgment with res judicata effect. Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104 (1938). Justice Oaks II, supra at 1552; See In re Varat
Enterprises, Inc., 81 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir.1996). The Confirmation Order
“is an absolute bar to the subsequent action or suit between the same parties
... not only in respect of every matter that was actually offered and received
to sustain the demand, but also as to every [claim] which might have been
presented.” Justice Oaks II, supra at 1552.
On April 15, 1997, the Court entered its Order confirming
the Plan. It is without dispute that the Government did not object to
confirmation and did not appeal the April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order. This
Court is satisfied that the Government is bound by the terms of the confirmed
Plan. This is so, even though CCC did not vote to accept it, In re Holywell Corp., 93 B.R. 780, 783 (S.D.Fla.1988) affirmed
Miami Center v. Bank of New York, 881 F.2d 1086 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied
493 U.S. 1057, 110 S.Ct. 867, 107 L.Ed.2d 951 (1990);
See also In re General Development Corp., 84 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir.1996),
and although the Plan ultimately provides CCC with less than that to which CCC
might have been otherwise entitled. Holywell, supra
at 783, quoting In re St. Louis Freight Lines, Inc., 45 B.R. 546, 552
(Bankr.E.D.Mich.1984).
Nonetheless, the Government contends that its assertion of
its setoff rights is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata
because the Plan, as approved by the April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order, was
conditioned upon MarAd approval of certain transfers
of subsidy rights to the reorganized Debtor. Since MarAd
declined those approvals, the Government contends that the condition went
unfulfilled, so that the April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order never became final.
[7] Contrary to the Government's position, however, the
April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order is a final order which is to be accorded full
res judicata effect. While it is true that the Order
of Confirmation was subject to a condition subsequent, the availability of the MarAd subsidy, this only effected
the feasibility of the Plan but had no impact on the terms of the Plan dealing
with the treatment of allowed claims. The availability of the MarAd subsidy was of no consequence to the other Plan
provisions or the Order of Confirmation. Clearly, the Order was final because
it no longer required any judicial intervention to deal with the confirmation
process. The fact that the Debtor's Plan was modified does not change the res judicata effect of the April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order.
11 U.S.C. § 1127(b); In re Attalla Golf and Country Club, Inc., 181 B.R. 611,
615 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1995) (“Congress intended § 1127(b) ... as a device to
adjust the plan to changed circumstances after confirmation not as a means to
collaterally attack a final order”). The Amended Confirmation Order entered by
this Court on July 17, 1997, states,
The April 15 Confirmation Order was not
subject of any timely-filed appeal and is now final. The Amended and
Restated Third Modification represents a narrow and limited modification of the
Original Plan, and nothing herein suggests that any unchanged provisions of the
April 15 Confirmation Order are being modified or ruled on anew. This
Confirmation Order is intended, however, top incorporate in one single order
all of the Confirmation rulings, whether part of the April 15 confirmation
Order or whether relating to the Amended and Restated Third Modification.
...
The April 15 Confirmation Order is a final
and nonappealable order. Except
as expressly modified by this Confirmation Order, the April 15 Confirmation
Order remains in full force and effect.
Amended Confirmation Order, at pp. 2, 15.
Furthermore, the Debtor and the Government, specifically the
IRS, negotiated language for the Confirmation Order which preserved the
Government's right of setoff with respect to the IRS. That language, which was
included in the Confirmation Order entered by this Court, provides,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, with respect to the
plan obligation of the United States of America on behalf of the Internal
Revenue Service, confirmation of the modified plan does not affect any right of
the United States to setoff no more than $225,056.50 on account of its claim
alleged in its plan objection, without prejudice to the right of the purchaser,
the Debtor, the Reorganized Debtor, or any other party to contest the amount of
the claim should the United States exercise such right of setoff.
Confirmation Order, p. 79-80.
The doctrine of res judicata
clearly applies to the April 15, 1997 Confirmation Order and, therefore, in
accordance with the provisions of the confirmed Plan, the Government is
precluded from asserting its setoff rights.
WHETHER CCC WAIVED ITS SETOFF CLAIM BY FILING A GENERAL UNSECURED CLAIM
AND A BALLOT AS AN UNSECURED CREDITOR?
Even considering, without concluding that the Government's
right to setoff was not barred by res judicata, this
Court would still have to consider the issue of whether the Government waived
its right to setoff. The Government contends that there is no need to assert a
setoff right in a proof of claim. The Debtor, on the other hand, contends that
a right to setoff is a claim that must be filed in order to preserve it.
[8][9][10][11][12] In its proof of claim, a creditor “must
indicate the amount of its claim and the extent which it is secured or
unsecured.” In re 183 Lorraine Street Assoc., 198 B.R. 16, 26
(E.D.N.Y.1996). The filing of a proof of claim without asserting a
setoff right constitutes a waiver of that right. In re Gehrke,
158 B.R. 465, 468 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 1993) (citation
omitted); In re Aquasport, Inc., 115 B.R. 720,
721-722 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1990), aff'd. 155 B.R. 245
(S.D.Fla.1992), aff'd. 985 F.2d 579
(11th Cir.1993). Further, a party may waive its right to setoff by
failing to timely assert it and if a creditor provides information that its
claim is not subject to setoff and the debtor relies on that information to his
detriment, then the right to setoff may be waived. In re Apex International
Management Services, Inc., 155 B.R. 591, 595 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1993), aff'd. 1996 WL 172210 (M.D.Fla.1996).
This is exactly the situation in which the parties find themselves now.
CCC's initial Claim states,
14. CCC is entitled to participate in the distribution of
any funds available as an unsecured nonpriority
creditor;
15. No security interest is held in these claims;
16. These claims are not subject to any setoff or
counterclaim;
17. The filing of this proof of claim is not to be construed
as a waiver of the rights of the United States or CCC to follow any of its
property or the proceeds thereof into anyone's hands, or as a waiver of any
other rights or claims whatsoever;
...
21. This claim reflects the known liability of the
petitioner in this matter to this agency of the United States. The United
States reserves the right to amend this proof of claim to assert liabilities
subsequently discovered or determined for any other reasons heretofore unknown; ...
The Debtor relied to its detriment on the information
contained in CCC's proof of claim. This conclusion is
obvious from the Debtor's classification of specific creditors. Based upon
information known the Debtor, the Debtor identified all known claimants
asserting setoff rights and placed them in Class 5. Based upon the information
in CCC's initial claim, the Debtor identified CCC as
a Class 17, unsecured tort claimant. CCC did nothing, until after confirmation,
to assert its right to setoff. This Court, therefore, is satisfied that by
filing the proof of claim as unsecured and by failing to object to confirmation
of the Plan which treats its claim as unsecured, CCC waived its right to
setoff. See In re Village Craftsman, Inc., 160 B.R. 740, 748 (Bankr.N.J.1993);
See also In re United Marine Shipbuilding, Inc., 198 B.R. 970, 978
(Bankr.W.D.Wash.1996) (Right of setoff waived by conduct inconsistent with
exercising right of setoff.)
Based upon the foregoing, even if the April 15, 1997
Confirmation Order is not res judicata, this Court
finds that throughout the entire reorganization process, the Government acted
inconsistently with its exercise of its setoff rights, the Debtor detrimentally
relied upon the information supplied by the Government, and, therefore, the
Government waived its right to setoff.
[13][14] The Government, however, contends that its setoff
right was not waived because the initial proof of claim was amended by the
Amended Claim which relates back to the date of the initial claim. The Amended
Claim dated December 12, 1996 and filed on February 24, 1997 provides, in
pertinent part,
12.... These unpaid freight bills owed the debtor are held
subject to setoff against CCC's claim; ...
21. This claim reflects the known liability of the petitioner
in this matter to this agency of the United States. The United States reserves
the right to amend this proof of claim to assert liabilities subsequently
discovered or determined for any other reasons heretofore unknown. The identification
of any sums held subject to setoff is without prejudice to any other right
under 11 U.S.C. § 553 to set off, against this claim, debts owed to debtors by
this or any other federal agency; ...
The Government, by its Amended Claim, inappropriately seeks
to change the status of the claim for the first time from unsecured to secured. See In re Wrenn Insurance
Agency of Missouri, Inc., 178 B.R. 792, 798-799
(Bankr.W.D.Mo.1995). Claimants asserting setoff rights are treated as
secured claimants pursuant to § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re National
Merchandise Co., Inc., 206 B.R. 993, 999
(Bankr.M.D.Fla.1997). The secured claim cannot relate back to the initial claim
and is a new claim which is barred by the bar date. In re Alliance Operating
Corp., 60 F.3d 1174, 1175 (5th Cir.1995); ; In re W.F.
Monroe Cigar Co., 166 B.R. 110, 112-113 (N.D.Ill.1994).
WHETHER THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO DENY THE RIGHT OF
SETOFF IN THIS CASE?
[15] Even assuming without concluding that in theory the
Government is entitled to assert a right of setoff, this Court still has the
discretion to prohibit the Government's exercise of setoff for equitable
reasons. See In re Securities Group 1980, 74 F.3d 1103, 1114 (11th Cir.1996)
(Bankruptcy courts have the discretion to deny setoff on equitable grounds.);
See also U.S. v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767 (3rd Cir.1983) As
stated in In re Pyramid Industries, Inc., 210 B.R.
445 (N.D.Ill.1997),
As noted, section 553 does not require the bankruptcy court
to allow or disallow a setoff. In fact, the bankruptcy court must exercise its
equitable discretion in deciding to allow or disallow a setoff under section
553. See In re Lakeside, 151 B.R. [887] at 890
[(N.D.Ill.1993)]. The bankruptcy court should not automatically enforce the
right merely because it is permitted under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. (citing In
re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d [483] at 484-85 [(7th
Cir.1988)]),
Id. at 451-452.
[16] Setoff may be denied where the creditor acted
inequitably; where the setoff would jeopardize the debtor's ability to
reorganize; or in a liquidation context where the setoff would result in either
a preference or priority over other unsecured creditors. Pyramid Industries,
supra at 451-452.
[17] Here, prebankruptcy,
thousands of other shippers utilized the Debtor's vessels to ship cargo,
resulting in claims for cargo loss or damage upon the Chapter 11 intervention.
The cargo loss claims of all of the other shippers are dealt with in the
confirmed Plan as either Class 16 general unsecured or Class 17 tort claims,
providing for payment of only a portion of their claims. During the Debtor's
Chapter 11 case, CCC acted the same as other unsecured cargo claimants by
filing an unsecured claim, casting a nonvoting ballot as an unsecured creditor,
and failing to object to the Plan provisions which prohibit setoff. The Debtor
contends, and this Court agrees, that if CCC, as a commercial shipper, is
allowed to setoff its claim, CCC would be unfairly favored over other
commercial shippers who are also creditors.
In addition, this reorganization came to fruition only
because of the substantial concessions made by parties who otherwise, under
applicable law, would have been entitled to full payment or substantially more
superior treatment than they are receiving under the confirmed Plan. All of the
major players tried so hard to achieve a consensus and assist in the successful
reorganization of the Debtor. Had these parties known that the Debtor's
$2,832,711.00 claim against MarAd would be completely
eliminated if setoff were permitted, these parties might not have been willing
to make their substantial concessions in their effort to save the Debtor, which
in turn would have had a serious negative impact on the reorganization process.
Based on the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that first,
the April 15, 1997, Order of Confirmation effectively bars the setoff claim of
the Government based on the doctrine of res judicata;
second, that the Government waived the right to setoff by its conduct; and,
third, it would be inequitable in any event to permit the Government to use
setoff under the facts established by this record.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the United States of
America's Motion to Exercise Administrative Offset be, and the same is hereby
denied. It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGE AND DECREED that the Debtor's Objection to the United States of America's Motion to Exercise Administrative Offset be, and the same is hereby sustained. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Debtor's Cross-Motion to Enforce the Provisions of the Confirmation Order be, and the same is hereby granted.